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1. Introduction
Models of strategic competition in quantities are a mainstay of the undergraduate curriculum at
multiple levels. The Cournot model of oligopoly is frequently taught in both introductory and
intermediate microeconomics, and its various extensions form a core component of most courses in
industrial organization. Moreover, models of competition in quantities are also commonly used in the
international trade classroom when covering ‘new’ trade theory models of the reciprocal dumping
variety. The models provide important insights into core concepts from game theory and into the
implications of variations in market structure for economic outcomes. Hence, it is important that
students develop a solid understanding of the properties of these models.
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There are a number of ways to teach models of strategic competition in quantities like the Cournot
model. At the principles level a graphical approach is likely to be adopted, while in intermediate and
senior-level industrial organization classes, simple models of competition in quantities are often used
to introduce more general concepts from game theory and are typically solved algebraically for simple
functional forms. A useful analog to these approaches is the use of numerical examples, which are a
good mechanism for developing economic intuition. Numerical simulation makes abstract results
more compelling for students, allows faster and more general demonstration of model properties, and
can help connect models based on a common foundation. There are a wide range of examples in the
literature, including models from microeconomics principles (Mixon and Tohamy, 2000),
international trade (Gilbert and Oladi, 2011), macroeconomics (Findley, 2014) and ﬁnancial
economics (Guo and Gilbert, 2014).
While there are many platforms on which numerical simulations can be built, Excel has a number
of advantages for pedagogical purposes.1 It allows for both tabular and graphical presentations of
information, can be used to solve quite complex problems, and is widely available on many computer
platforms. It is a also a program with which most students are already familiar, and it is widely used
outside of the classroom.
In this paper we describe a series of numerical simulation models built in Excel that can be used to
support instruction on models of strategic competition in quantities. As in Guo and Gilbert (2014), the
models are built in such a way that they respond instantly to changes, have a consistent presentation
across various extensions, and gradually build complexity onto a common foundation.2 The paper is
organized as follows. In the next section we set out the structure of the basic model and its solution,
followed by a review of the geometry of the problem. We then turn to the question of how to
implement the model as a numerical simulation in Excel. Next, we discuss how the resources we have
built can be obtained and used, and we provide details on various extensions. Throughout we provide
examples of exercises that can be used to explore the implications of differences in market structure
for various economic variables of interest. We conclude with a few notes on how the approach we have
taken in this paper could be extended to other topics.

2. The basic Cournot duopoly
We begin by sketching the basic Cournot duopoly model and its solution. We follow a standard,
textbook approach and assume: (1) there are two ﬁrms (no entry); (2) ﬁrms have constant marginal
and average costs, denoted ci; (3) the ﬁrms are producing a homogeneous product; (4) the overall
market demand function is linear, with the inverse demand being speciﬁed as P(Q) = a  bQ where a,
b > 0 and a > ci; and (5) the ﬁrms must choose their outputs simultaneously.3
The Cournot output represents a Nash equilibrium in a game where ﬁrms simultaneously choose
output. Thus, the equilibrium is a list of price and output levels for each ﬁrm such that neither ﬁrm can
increase their proﬁts by changing their output given that the other ﬁrm does not change their output.
Formally, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a triplet f pc ; qc1 ; qc2 g such that:
 Given q2 ¼ qc2 ; qc1 solves maxq1 p1 ðq1 ; qc2 Þ
 Given q1 ¼ qc1 ; qc2 solves maxq2 p2 ðqc1 ; q2 Þ
 pc ¼ a  bðqc1 þ qc2 Þ
We begin by solving ﬁrm 1’s maximization problem, whereby ﬁrm 1 chooses it’s proﬁt maximizing
quantity and takes ﬁrm 2’s quantity as given. This yields ﬁrm 1’s best response function, R1 ðqc2 Þ.
1
Excel is useful in other contexts too. Wight (1999) discusses some general beneﬁts of using spreadsheets beyond numerical
simulation, while Briand and Hill (2013) consider the use of Excel for econometrics.
2
While we present the models as a progression from relatively simple models to more complex ones, instructors may use the
resources in the reverse order if they prefer. The model of monopolistic competition is the most general, and the others can be
classed as special cases derived by adding more restrictive assumptions.
3
A more complete treatment of the model, and those that follow, can be found in typical industrial organization texts, such as
Carlton and Perloff (2005).
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maxða  bðq1 þ qc2 ÞÞq1  c1 q1
q1

The ﬁrst order condition for a maximum is:4
a  2bq1  bqc2  c1 ¼ 0
and the explicit best response function is:
R1 ðqc2 Þ ¼

a  c1 1 c
 q2
2
2b

Using symmetry, ﬁrm 2’s maximization will yield a similar best response function, R2 ðqc1 Þ.
R2 ðqc1 Þ ¼

a  c2 1 c
 q1
2
2b

Equilibrium occurs at the intersection of these two best response functions. By substituting ﬁrm 2’s
best response function into ﬁrm 1’s, we solve for qc1 :
qc1 ¼

a  2c1 þ c2
3b

and similarly for qc2 ,
qc2 ¼

a  2c2 þ c1
3b

Market quantity is given by Q c ¼ qc1 þ qc2 , while the price is pc = a  bQc. We can then substitute back for
the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, consumer surplus, or any other economic variable of interest.
3. The geometry of the solution
The solution to the model can be illustrated in several ways. In Fig. 1, we show the proﬁt
maximizing output choice of ﬁrm 1 for any given level of output of ﬁrm 2. The line labeled D is the
market demand curve. Subtracting the quantity produced by ﬁrm 2 (q2) from the market demand
curve yields the residual demand curve for ﬁrm 1, labeled RD1. The line labeled c1 is ﬁrm 1’s marginal
(and average) cost. The ﬁrm maximizes proﬁt by producing the quantity where the marginal revenue
arising from the residual demand curve (labeled MR1) is equal to the marginal cost, at point a. Drawing
a vertical line up to the residual demand curve (at b) yields the market price. Since the distance bd is
equal to q2, the market clears. A similar diagram can be constructed for ﬁrm 2.
The equilibrium outcome for both ﬁrms is described in Fig. 2. The best response functions describe
the proﬁt maximizing output choices of each ﬁrm as a function of the output choices of the rival. The
best response of ﬁrm 1 is labeled R1, while that of ﬁrm 2 is labeled R2. The Nash equilibrium is where
the two best responses coincide, i.e., point a.
The best response functions have the property that proﬁt is maximized for ﬁrm 1 at point b, and for
ﬁrm 2 at point c. These are the monopoly levels of output. Proﬁt is minimized for ﬁrm 1 at point d, and
for ﬁrm 2 at point e, which correspond to where price equals marginal cost, or the competitive level of
output.
While the Cournot model is static in nature, the best response curves can also be used to show that
if we start at a disequilibrium point, the adjustment process will converge to the Nash Equilibrium
using best response dynamics (as long as ﬁrm 2’s best response is steeper than ﬁrm 1’s in the two good
case). Starting from any point, one can imagine ﬁrms responding sequentially to the other ﬁrm’s
output based on the best response curves which will move the ﬁrms towards the equilibrium point.
These dynamics can help students imagine an adjustment process and also understand the stability of
the equilibrium.5
4
5

It is easy to see that the second-order condition is also satisﬁed.
See Durlauf and Blume (2008) for a discussion on stability and Cabral (2000) for a dynamic interpretation.
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Fig. 1. The Decision of Firm 1

Conceptually, we can also envisage the best response functions in terms of two sets of concave
isoproﬁt curves, with higher proﬁts to each ﬁrm the lower the rival’s output. The loci of the peaks of
the isoproﬁts are the best response functions. Hence, at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the isoproﬁt
curves are orthogonal. Since they are concave, it must be possible to ﬁnd a Pareto improvement over
the Nash equilibrium. That is, if both ﬁrms could agree to reduce output, they could both enjoy higher
proﬁts.
The solution to the joint proﬁt maximization problem in fact lies at any point along the dotted line
between c and b, which is the locus of tangencies of the isoproﬁts of each ﬁrm.6 The point labeled f is
one such solution, with each ﬁrm producing exactly half the monopoly level of output. Point g
represents the equilibrium that would be obtained if the ﬁrms move sequentially (with ﬁrm 1 deciding
on its output level ﬁrst). We discuss this case further below.
4. Building an Excel version
There are a number of ways to build a simulation model in Excel. In many cases, the SOLVER add-in
is used. This feature can solve optimization problems directly, but requires that the add-in be correctly
installed and set up. It also requires that the optimization routine be launched, either manually or via a
6
Assuming symmetric marginal costs. If marginal costs differ, the joint proﬁt maximizing solution is at the end point of the
best response function of the lower cost ﬁrm.
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Fig. 2. Equilibrium outcomes.

macro, before a change can be observed. Hence, it adds a degree of complexity to the model-building
and is best used when the problem involves signiﬁcant nonlinearities and/or when obtaining closed
form solutions is difﬁcult.
In the case at hand, the use of linear demand and cost functions makes solving the problem for a
closed form solution relatively simple, so we can implement the solution directly in the Excel sheets’
cells. This has the advantage of avoiding potential difﬁculties with SOLVER and also makes the entire
model ‘live’ in the sense that it responds instantly to any changes in parameters.
The process is quite straightforward. We begin by designating cells to hold values for exogenous
parameters. In Fig. 3 these are cells D5, D6, D10 and D18. Next we allocate cells to contain the values of
the endogenous variables, blocking them into logical groups (cells D11 through D14, D19 through D22
and D26 through D29). For consistency across the various sheets, we have adopted the coloring
convention that white cells can be changed and those in gray are derived from the model.
To ﬁll in the endogenous variables, we enter the solutions as formulas involving the exogenous
variable cells. We begin with the solutions for qc1 and qc2 . In cells D11 and D19, respectively, we enter
the following formulas:
ðD5  2  D10 þ D18Þ=ð3  D6Þ
ðD5  2  D18 þ D10Þ=ð3  D6Þ
These are just the solutions derived in Section 2 expressed in terms of the appropriate cells. From there
on, the remaining entries are straightforward:
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Fig. 3. Excel layout.









Total output in cell D26 is D11 + D19.
Price in cell D27 is D5  D6 * D26.
Revenue for ﬁrms 1 and 2 in cells D12 and D20 are D11*D27 and D19*D27, respectively.
Total costs for ﬁrms 1 and 2 in cells D13 and D21 are D11*D10 and D19*D18, respectively.
Proﬁts for ﬁrms 1 and 2 in cells D14 and D22 are D12  D13 and D20  D21, respectively.
Consumer surplus in cell D28 is deﬁned as (D5  D27) * D26/2.
Total surplus in cell D29 is deﬁned as D14 + D22 + D28.

Note that it is not necessary to obtain closed form solutions for all of the endogenous variables. We
can express the solutions either in terms of exogenous factors directly, or in terms of endogenous
factors which have already been expressed in closed form. In effect, Excel will do the necessary
substitutions for us.
To complement the numerical solutions, we present graphs, as shown in Fig. 4. The two stacked
graphs on the left of the ﬁgure present the residual demands faced by each ﬁrm, while on the right we
have the best response functions. These depictions are much the same as those shown in Section 3 and
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Fig. 4. Excel graphs.

are typical of textbook treatments. However, they are also ‘live’ and will move directly as the
parameters of the model are changed.7
We ﬁnish the model by adding ‘spinners’ to allow the parameters of the model to be varied easily
and smoothly (and also to prevent entry of parameters values outside the sensible range).8 Color
coding then provides a mechanism to link the geometry and the tabular results, and to maintain a
consistent look and feel across the models.
5. Obtaining and using the Excel models
To make the Excel resources as accessible as possible we have set up a webpage where the Cournot
model, and a number of extensions described below, can be downloaded. The URL for the website is:
http://sites.google.com/site/economicmodelsinexcel/io. To get started, simply download the model(s), open the ﬁle(s) in Excel, and try changing any value in a white cell.9 The model’s numerical
solutions and the corresponding graphs should respond instantaneously.
7
The graphs themselves are just connected scatterplots. The data underlying them, which is based on the visible cells, is
hidden in the sheet to the right of the model.
8
There are several alternatives for dealing with the possibility of entering parameter values outside of the range that
guarantees an interior solution. One way is to control the possible parameters using the range controls on spinners (possibly in
combination with locking the cell content to avoid overwriting). Another is to use conditional statements in the solution cells
themselves. For example, if the marginal cost exceeds the price intercept of the residual demand curve, quantity supplied is
zero, and is determined by the marginal revenue equals marginal cost condition otherwise. A third approach is simply to do
nothing – the solution will cease to make economic sense, and this can be used to lead discussion as to why. If the marginal cost
exceeds the intercept of the residual demand, for example, the calculated quantity will be negative. This is of course nonsense,
but the reasoning is useful for understanding the model, and is an important lesson in itself. If the marginal cost of production
exceeds the highest price any customer would be willing to pay, it cannot make economic sense to produce.
9
The models were built using the latest version of Excel for Windows, but will work in any recent version of Excel, including
Excel for Mac. For users of open-source software, the models will also work in OpenOfﬁce on Windows and Linux platforms. The
numerical component of the models even works in web-based platforms, such as Google Docs. However, the graphical
capabilities of the latter are not yet sufﬁcient to accommodate the live ﬁgures.

56

D. Gorry, J. Gilbert / International Review of Economics Education 18 (2015) 49–61

We have found this type of model to be pedagogically useful in two distinct ways. First, the models
can be used as part of classroom demonstrations, with appropriate projection equipment. The
diagrams are much the same as those used in typical textbooks and slides, but have the distinct
advantage of being based on a speciﬁc numerical example, which many students ﬁnd helpful, and of
responding ‘live’ to changes in the underlying parameters. Hence it is possible to explore many more
scenarios quickly with these types of tools than would be feasible doing numerical examples by hand.
The second way that we have found this type of model useful is as part of guided assignments. In
this respect the approach is quasi-experimental. Since the models are deterministic, they are
obviously not truly experimental, but assignments can be set up so that students can discover and take
ownership of the properties of the model themselves by experimenting with the parameters and
observing the resulting changes. Considering the limiting values of parameters is a particularly useful
way of developing an understanding of how the models work. Some possible starting points for the
Cournot model might be (with learning objectives in italics):
1. Allow the marginal costs to differ across ﬁrms. How does the equilibrium output of the low-cost
ﬁrm compare to the output of the high-cost ﬁrm? Which ﬁrm has higher proﬁts? We ﬁnd that the
lower cost ﬁrm will produce more and make higher proﬁts in equilibrium than the higher cost ﬁrm.
2. How does the proﬁt of the two ﬁrms depend on the slope of the market demand curve? Can you
explain the pattern you observe? The slope of the demand curve relates to the elasticity of demand,
which in turn is a measure of the ﬁrm’s collective market power. The ﬂatter the curve, the less the market
power, and consequently the lower the price and proﬁt.
3. Could the cost of one ﬁrm be so high that it would choose to produce nothing? If so, how high would
the cost have to be? How much would the other ﬁrm produce in this case? How would their proﬁt
compare to the case where both ﬁrms produced? If the cost of one ﬁrm is high enough (equal to the
price intercept of the residual demand at their rival’s optimal output) they will cease to produce. The
other ﬁrm will respond by fully exploiting its monopoly power and will have greater proﬁt.
4. Imagine that one ﬁrm received a subsidy, which lowers its marginal cost, potentially below zero. Is
it possible to lower marginal cost so much that the rival chooses to exit the market? It is possible, if
the subsidy is enough to drive the market price down to the marginal cost of the rival. In this case the
price is at the competitive outcome.
5. Do consumers win or lose in the above scenarios? Consumer surplus depends on the market price, so
they lose in scenario 3 and gain in scenario 4.

6. Extensions
Following the approach outlined above for the Cournot duopoly case, we built several variations to
allow students to see how different market structures affect the equilibrium outcome and how these
market structures relate. With each variation, we solve the model and enter it into Excel exactly as
outlined above for the Cournot case, taking care to maintain consistency in presentation across the
models. Because of the similarity in the basic approach, we omit a detailed discussion and focus on a
brief description of the model extensions and the exercises that can help students learn key features of
the extensions and how the models relate to one another.
6.1. Differentiated goods
The basic Cournot model assumes that the ﬁrms produce a homogeneous good. Many industries,
however, are comprised of ﬁrms producing similar but not identical products. These products are
often distinguished by different branding. Examples include different varieties of cereal, different
types of fast food restaurants, or different models of cars. To capture the nature of interactions
between ﬁrms with related products, the differentiated goods model extends the simple Cournot
duopoly case by modifying the market demand structure. The model allows ﬁrms to face related but
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different inverse demand curves, while retaining the assumption of simultaneous quantity choices.
The inverse linear demands are given as follows:10
p1 ðq1 ; q2 Þ ¼ a1  b1 q1  b2 q2
p2 ðq1 ; q2 Þ ¼ a2  b2 q1  b1 q2
2

2

Here, b1  b2 so that the price of a good responds more to a change in the quantity of that good than to
a change in the quantity of the related good. The b2 parameter captures how closely related the two
products are. If the products are not at all closely related, then b2 approaches 0. At the other extreme, if
products are homogenous, then b2 = b1.
The solution procedure is essentially the same as that set out in Section 2. The model is useful for
showing how product differentiation relates to market power. If the products of both ﬁrms are very
similar, the model gives results approaching Cournot. If the products of the two ﬁrms are unrelated,
then each ﬁrm will act as a monopoly. Some exercises that can be conducted to illustrate these
concepts include:
1. Give examples of products where the slope parameter on the rival good (b2) approaches zero. Give
examples of products where the slope parameter on the rival good (b2) approaches the demand
slope (b1). When the b2 parameters are zero, the goods are unrelated. Examples are numerous and may
include butter and footballs, staplers and tennis shoes, etc. When b1 approaches b2, goods are very close
substitutes. Examples are numerous and may include yellow pencils and blue pencils, white bread and
wheat bread, etc.
2. What happens to the prices, quantities, and proﬁts of each ﬁrm as the slope parameter on the rival
good approaches zero? When the b2 parameters are zero and the goods are unrelated, we have two
monopolists.
3. What happens to the slope of the best response function of each ﬁrm when the rival slope
decreases? Explain why the slope of the response function changes. It becomes steeper/ﬂatter. This is
telling us that the ﬁrm’s do not respond to one another.
4. Set the demand rival slope equal to the demand slope. Compare your results to the Cournot duopoly
model with the same demand slope and costs. Do you get the outcome you expected? When b1 = b2
and the goods are perfect substitutes, i.e., homogeneous, the model coincides with the standard Cournot
model.

6.2. Many ﬁrms
The many ﬁrm case mirrors the Cournot duopoly case, but allows the user to choose the number of
ﬁrms in the market, n, where n  1. We have set the problem up such that ﬁrm 1 may have a cost
structure that differs from all the other ﬁrms, in order to maintain consistency with the other Excel
sheets. Since all ﬁrms enter simultaneously, the problem is not substantially different than the one
discussed in Section 2. This sheet is particularly useful for considering the relationship between
Cournot, monopoly and competitive market outcomes, the key result being that the Cournot model
converges to the competitive outcome.
Geometrically, the equilibrium can be illustrated by modifying the best response diagram. Fig. 5 is
drawn in the space of the output choice for ﬁrm 1, and the aggregate output of the remaining ﬁrms (we
can aggregate by virtue of homogeneity). Suppose that there are three ﬁrms. The best response R1
shows the proﬁt maximizing level of output for ﬁrm 1 given any level of aggregate output by the other
two ﬁrms, and is the same as before (since the ﬁrms are identical, ﬁrm 1 is indifferent as to the source
of rival production.)
The curve labeled nR2 represents the aggregate best responses of the two rivals. Should ﬁrm
1 produce at the competitive output level, the optimal response of all rivals is to produce nothing.
Hence, the horizontal intercept of the aggregate best response is the same as for an individual rival
ﬁrm. If ﬁrm 1 produces nothing, however, the remaining two ﬁrms will operate as a duopoly,
10

See Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vivies (1984) for the derivation of this demand system from a utility framework.
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Fig. 5. Equilibrium outcomes with more than two ﬁrms.

producing a higher level of output than a monopoly (since the Cournot output level exceeds the joint
proﬁt maximizing, or monopoly, output level). Hence the vertical intercept of the aggregate best
response function is higher than for a single ﬁrm.11 The Cournot outcome is at the intersection of the
best response functions (point a). Total market output at the Cournot equilibrium must be higher with
three ﬁrms than with two (and higher still with four, and so on) even though each ﬁrm produces less
(since the best response functions slope downward.) Some useful exercises that can be conducted
with this simulation model include the following:

1. If you set number of other ﬁrms equal to zero, how does the outcome compare to that of a
monopoly? With only one ﬁrm, the outcome will be monopoly. Cournot oligopoly converges to
monopoly as the number of ﬁrms approaches 1.
2. If you set number of other ﬁrms equal to one, how does the outcome compare to the Cournot
duopoly with the same demand and cost parameters? This case will simply replicate the Cournot
duopoly.
3. What happens to the total output, price, and total surplus as the number of ﬁrms increases? As the
number of ﬁrms increases, output rises, price falls and total surplus rises. The price should get closer and
closer to marginal cost. The Cournot model converges to the competitive outcome.

11
In fact, for the symmetric case with linear demands and constant marginal costs, Cournot output is 33.3 percent higher than
the monopoly output, as can be easily veriﬁed in the simulation models.
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6.3. Stackelberg duopoly
The Stackelberg duopoly returns to the homogenous good case and two ﬁrm assumptions of the
Cournot duopoly. The model differs from Cournot by allowing ﬁrms to act sequentially instead of
simultaneously. Firm 1 is the leader and chooses its quantity ﬁrst while ﬁrm 2 is the follower and
chooses its quantity after observing ﬁrm 1’s choice. This is a classic model for depicting ﬁrst-mover
advantage.
The game is solved via backward induction. Firm 2 will solve the same problem as in the Cournot
case, which will yield the same best response function. Firm 1 can predict ﬁrm 2’s best response
function and will take this into account when choosing how much quantity to produce in the ﬁrst
period. Mathematically, ﬁrm 1 maximizes its proﬁt subject to the market conditions, its own cost, and
ﬁrm 2’s output, assuming that ﬁrm 2 will maximize its own proﬁt in response to ﬁrm 1’s choice.12
Some useful exercises with this model include:
1. Compare the total equilibrium output and price obtained in the Stackelberg Model to the Cournot
Model (keeping costs and demand parameters constant). Why do the results differ? The total output
is actually higher in Stackelberg than in Cournot, and the price correspondingly lower.
2. Set costs of ﬁrm 1 equal to the costs of ﬁrm 2. Compare the ﬁrst mover’s (ﬁrm 1) production and
proﬁt to second mover’s production and proﬁt. Who is better off? How do the results compare to the
Cournot duopoly? Firm 1 produces more output and attains a higher proﬁt – there is a ﬁrst-mover
advantage in this model.
3. In the Cournot duopoly model, suppose that ﬁrm 1 received a subsidy from the government that
reduced its marginal cost, possibly below zero. Is it possible for a subsidy to generate the
Stackelberg output levels? How much proﬁt would ﬁrm 1 make if so? How much would they make
net of the subsidy payments? This exercise reveals the logic underlying strategic trade policy (if we
imagine the ﬁrms being in separate countries). A subsidy that induces ﬁrm 1 to produce the Stackelberg
output level induces ﬁrm 2 to reduce its output similarly. The subsidy is equivalent to granting a ﬁrstmover advantage, and proﬁt net of subsidy payments is maximized.

6.4. Stackelberg with many ﬁrms
Next we combine the Stackelberg model with the many ﬁrms model. In this case, ﬁrm 1 moves ﬁrst,
and then all the other ﬁrms choose quantity simultaneously in the follower round after observing ﬁrm
1’s choice. Again, the model is solved via backwards induction.
The equilibrium outcome can be seen in Fig. 5, at point g. As noted above, this diagram is drawn in
the space of the output choice for ﬁrm 1, and the aggregate output of the follower ﬁrms. Once again,
the key point is that the aggregated best response function for the rival ﬁrms rotates upward around
the horizontal intercept when the number of rival ﬁrms increases. This increases the total market
output and lowers the price. With a large number of ﬁrms in the second stage, we effectively have a
short-run variant of the dominant ﬁrm with a competitive fringe model.
1. What happens to the proﬁts of the ﬁrst mover as the number of second movers increases? It declines.
This is the key result from this model, the ﬁrst mover advantage diminishes when the number of rivals is
large (and disappears when the second stage is competitive.)
2. Is there some point where the number of rival ﬁrms would not rise further? If we imagine that ﬁrms
can choose to be in the second stage or not then yes, eventually the price would fall below the marginal
cost of the second mover ﬁrms, and entry would not make sense. We explore this idea further with the
next model.
3. What happens to the output of the ﬁrst mover as the number of second movers increases? It remains
constant. The lesson is that being a ﬁrst mover can lead to dominant market share, even if it doesn’t
always lead to a proﬁt advantage.
12
The outcome is depicted in Fig. 2 as point g, the best isoproﬁt of ﬁrm 1 that can be reached while staying on ﬁrm 2’s best
response.
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4. Assume that the number of ﬁrms in the second stage must be such that proﬁt for the typical second
mover is just above zero. If the marginal cost of the ﬁrst mover falls, what must happen to the
number of second movers? If the marginal cost of the ﬁrst mover is lower, it can proﬁtably produce
more. For given demand conditions, this leaves less market share for the second movers. Hence, their
number must decline unless they (temporarily) accept losses.

6.5. Monopolistic competition
In our ﬁnal extension, we show how we can use the basic Cournot setup to derive a model of
monopolistic competition. We return to a simultaneous move game with many ﬁrms, but the number
of ﬁrms is no longer ﬁxed. Instead, ﬁrms face both marginal and ﬁxed costs and the number of ﬁrms
that exist in the market is determined endogenously. The number of ﬁrms is decided by an entry
condition, with ﬁrms entering until zero proﬁt holds. Again for consistency across the models, we
allow ﬁrm 1 to have (potentially) different costs than the remaining ﬁrms.13
1. What is the proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 if costs are the same as all other ﬁrms? All ﬁrms make zero proﬁt in
equilibrium in this case.
2. How does the proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 change if the marginal cost falls? If the ﬁxed cost falls? If ﬁrm 1 has
lower costs (marginal or ﬁxed) it will make higher proﬁts, although only the marginal costs affect output.
3. What happens to the number of ﬁrms as ﬁxed costs increase? The number of ﬁrms falls, some must
exit in order to keep price at average cost.
4. How many ﬁrms do you think would enter if the ﬁxed cost of production was equal to the proﬁt
ﬁrm’s made in the Cournot duopoly (assuming symmetry)? The optimal number of ﬁrms would be
two. The market outcome would replicate Cournot, with the exception of producer proﬁts.
4. What would happen if ﬁxed costs were very close to zero? The market outcome would replicate
perfect competition. This can be veriﬁed by comparing to the Cournot model with many ﬁrms.

7. Concluding comments
Numerical simulation is a very useful tool for reinforcing students’ economic intuition on model
behavior and for emphasizing the linkages between various economic models. The common
foundation of the models can sometimes be lost when covering many seemingly different structures.
Hence, much can be learned by experimenting with model parameters and seeing how the results of
different models converge, and numerical simulation models are well-suited to this task. Industrial
organization, with its almost limitless variety of models of market structure, is a particularly useful
area of application.
In this paper we have outlined a set of new resources that can be used to aid in teaching basic
models of strategic competition in quantities and extensions, along with suggestions for how they can
be used. The models are all built in Excel, use a consistent interface, and are freely available for
download. We presented a total of six models in this paper. There are of course many other possible
variations. We could, for example, set up a model with differentiated goods and many ﬁrms or
differentiated goods with sequential entry.
The techniques that we have applied in building these models can be easily adapted to related
problems, and indeed to practically any economic theory taught at the undergraduate level. For
industrial organization in particular, it would be useful to develop similar models of strategic
competition in prices. Starting with the differentiated goods model described in this paper, it would be
possible to build a model of Bertrand duopoly, and perhaps extend it to a model of price leadership, for
example.

13
As it is set up, the costs of ﬁrm 1 should be no higher than the costs of the remaining ﬁrms. Also note that non-integer ﬁrm
numbers are allowed.
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